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NOTES AND CASE COMMENTS
COALITION POLITICS AND THE
REVITALIZATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
SAFEGUARDS: THE ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT
Promod Nair*
"It takes a united country to run a divided government"
-Clinton Rossiter'
Elections are the key means by which citizens in a liberal democracy can
signal their preferences and intentions to political elites.2 But much like the oracles by which ancient Greek gods divulged glimpses of the future to mortals, election results can sometimes be famously ambiguous and their meaning required to .
be picked over and assessed over an extended period. It is essentially such a challenge that confronts contemporary Indian polity.
Indian politics has altered a great deal over the past two decades - the era of
single-party rule has been put to rest by the emergence of multi-party coalition
governments.The political environment as has developed over the years after independence in the country and more particularly, the political scenario emerging
after the last two general elections, has generated a debate as to how accountability, the basic ingredient of the Parliamentary form of government, should be brought
in consonance with the much-desired stability. To tide over the problems faced by
a polity greatly vexed by fractured verdicts and hung parliaments, suggestions
have been made from multifarious quarters to the effect that to ensure the muchneeded stability,we should move away from a "Parliamentary") form of government to a "Presidential" one.
This paper however argues that stability and accountability can be achieved
within the framework of the present Constitution and witholit recourse to any
copybook model of a particular system of governance. This argument, based on a
plain reading of the relevant Constitutional provisions, in essence asserts that the
Parliament and the President are, in fact, co-equal institutions, neither being supe*
III Year, B.A., LL.B. (Hans.), National Law School of India University, Bangalore.

1

Mendelson, Wallace, Supreme Court Statecraft - The Rule of Law And Men, 326 (1987).

2

Dunleavy, Patrick, Andrew Gamble, Ian Holliday and Gilliam Peale (eds.), Developments in
British Politics, 47.

3

The assumption being that the Constitution as it stands, has provided for a Parliamentary or
"Westminster" form of government which in essence has been the importation into the Indian
context the form of government obtaining in Britain.
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rior to the other, but being necessary parts of a system of institutionalised checks
and balances. And,
"...herein indeed consists the true excellence of ... government, that all
the parts of it form a mutual check upon each other....Like distinct powers
in mechanics, they jointly impel the machine of government in a direction
different from what, either, acting by itself would have done ... a direction
which constitutes the true line of the liberty and happiness of the
country.
,,4

The issue, therefore, is not whether we should have a Parliamentary or
Presidential form of government, but whether, within the framework of the present
Constitution, an arrangement can be worked out to ensure the stability of
governments at the national level.
HUNG PARLIAMENTS AND COALITION POLITICS CONSTITUTIONAL GREY AREAS
The recently concluded mid-term polls to the twelfth Lok Sabha, in the golden
jubilee year of our independence, does not necessarily make us proud of our system
of democracy. While we may continue to harp on thematic cliches like 'India being
the largest democracy in the world', there is enough dismay and pessimism regarding
the performance of our political institutions. In this context, it is pertinent to take
note of the observation of a well-known political and constitutional commentator.
"No evaluation of a constitutional system
can be worthwhile if it ignores
5
the structure of the party-system."
4

Kavanagh, Dennis, British Politics-Continuities

5

Noorani, A.G., The Presidential System-The Indian Debate, 79 (1989).

of Change, 47 (3rd ed .. 1996).

It can be argued that the American and British systems owe their success to their respective
party systems. K.C. Wheare attributes the success of the U.S. and Canadian federal governments to their party systems. On the other side of the coin, it was the malfunctioning of the
party system that led to the fall of the Fourth Republic. The whole problem with the Fourth
Republic was not that it was dominated by political parties, but rather that those parties which
formed successive coalition governments were so internally divided and undisciplined in their
Parliamentary behaviour that the functioning of a responsible government became un viable.
The crux of the argument, therefore, is that irresponsible political parties are capable of ruining
any democratic system. Presidential or Parliamentary.
In this regard. it is enlightening to advert to the opinion expressed by Dr. Ambedkar in discussing the role of the personalities and political parties that run the Constitutional machinery. He
said, " ...however good a Constitution may be, it is sure to turn out bad because those who are
called to work it happen to be a bad lot .... The working of a Constitution does not depend
wholly upon the nature of the Constitution. The Constitution can provide only the organs of
State such as the legislature. the executive and the judiciary. The factors on which the working
of those organs of the State depend are the people and the political parties they will set up as
their instruments to carry out their wishes and policies ....••: C.A.D., Vol. II, p. 975.
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It is here that the Indian Constitution has, to a large extent, proved to be
inadequate6 - it makes no reference to the role and structure of political parties,
except perhaps in the Tenth Schedule, the value of which, again, has been marginal. It would be no? exaggeration to say that the present constitutional crisis has
been one created by the malfunctioning of the party system.
Hung Parliaments have exposed a key grey area of our Constitutional framework. The framers of our Constitution had failed to envisage and provide for such
an electoral possibility, influenced as they were by the assumption that the Parliamentary system essentially pre-supposes the existence of not more than two or
three political parties at the national level which could provide the choice of an
alternative to the people. The flaw in such an approach is in importing an alien
system of governance, developed in a totally different context, without creating
the necessary conditions which are conducive to such a systemic transplant. As a
result, in recent years, there have been several signs of a loss of support for our
constitutional arrangements.

6

However this is not so much a Constitutional flaw as it is the sad reflection of the failure on our
part to forge an efficient Constitutional culture. The Constitution cannot provide solutions to
an possible situations, but it is possible to develop an advanced Constitutional culture through
a process of continuous evolution, which can prove to useful in this regard. It is necessary to
understand that no Constitution can be perfect, nor can it provide for every contingency that
could arise in the future. Besides, conditions change and new concepts and situations emerge as
a result of changes in the social, political and economic conditions. The law which does not
change with the changing conditions and perceptions will inevitably become antiquated and
obsolete. It is in this context that Constitutional conventions assume importance. They serve as
a means of keeping Constitutions in tune with social and political reality, without recourse to
any formal amendments of the law.
As Sir Ivor Jennings put it:
"The laws provide only a framework; those who put the laws into operation give the framework meaning andfill in the interstices."
Therefore, while the Constitution of India is a very comprehensive document, there do exist
grey areas which must be filled by developing healthy and democratic Constitutional conventions.
-Munro, Colin R., Studies in Constitutional Law, 38 (1987).

7

However, as has been aptly observed by the incumbent President of India, Dr. K.R. Narayanan,
this is not to suggest that coalitions and hung legislatures are inevitable in India in an circumstances. It is possible that, if parties with appropriate leadership emerge, capable of gaining
support among the people on basic social and economic issues as distinct from parties based on
fragmented interests, narrowly organised on the basis of castes and sects, or on personalities
and personal ambitions of leaders, then it cannot be ruled out that a two or three party-system
will come up in India: The Hindu, May 22, 1998.
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- THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE

The Indian experience with coalition governments, both in the States and at
the Centre has been differentiated and complex. While, on an average, coalition
governments have been less stable than one-party governments, under certain specific conditions, they have shown more stability, the most important being the
ideological compatibility among the coalition partners.s
But, at the same time, there have also been instances when India's experiences with coalition governments in the states have not been salutary. There have
been numerous instances of coalition governments being plagued by swollen cabinets, paralysed decision-making, frequent party defections, politicised and demoralised bureaucracies, increased personal corruption and most alarmingly, a growing cynicism among the educated classes towards the Parliamentary and electoral
process. These provided fertile ground for politics of opportunism and ideological
extremism.9

While coalition politics and power-sharing arrangements are quite common in
parliamentary systems, the peculiar nature of the party system in India did not
require frequent experiments with such an arrangement, at least at the Centre.
However, coalition governments have been formed in the states, especially in the
post-1967 period.
It is interesting to note that the first coalition government in India was the
interim government, formed in preparation of independence, with the representatives of both the Congress and the Muslim League participating in the government. This government was, as Maulana Azad aptly remarked, "born in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust between the Congress and the League". 10 He goes
on to add that the principal objective of the League in joining the government was
to sabotage every move it took and that the experience of the conduct of the League
members was one of the critical factors that was responsible for Nehru accepting
the partition plan. II

8

Coalition governments, with a sizeable majority have by and large remained stable under conditions of polarisation of parties in a coalition with a dominant partner either on the Left or the
Right, for example, the Left-Front in West Bengal, the Akali-BJP coalition in Punjab, the
National Conference-Congress coalition in Jammu and Kashmir, the CPM-led Left Front in
West Bengal and the Congress-TUJS coalition in Tripura. See, Saxena, Rekha, "Coalition
Experiment: Problems and Prospects", Mainstream, April 25, 1998, p. 12.

9

See, Weiner, Myron, The Indian Paradox - Essays in Indian Politics, 235 (1989).

10 Azad, Maulana, India Wins Freedom,
11

Ibid., p. 201.

179 (1988).
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Independent India's first government - a 17 member Cabinet had 6 ministers
who were non-Congressmen.
However, these Ministers were gradually
marginalised and were either eased out of office or resigned (in protest) from the
Ministry. Subsequently, the first non-Congress government formed at the Centre
in 1977 was a coalition in which the Janata Party and the Akali Dal shared power.
The government headed by Charan Singh in 1979 was also a coalition, consisting
of representatives from the Janata-S, Congress-U and the AIADMK. The National
Front government headed by V.P. Singh was a five-party coalition consisting of
the Janata Dal, Congress-S, Telugu Desam, DMK and Asom Gana Parishad.'3
The short-lived Vajpayee government, though essentially consisting of Ministers
from the BJP, did have one representative from the Shiv Sena. The l3-member
United Front government has been the largest coalition, in terms of the number of
parties which formed part of the ruling coalition.
12

In India, coalition governments have, more often than not, survived on a
negative agenda.14 When a coalition government, its support base and logic of
unity is defined in essentially negative terms, the prospects of positive contributions in the form of decisive policy initiatives become remote, as the irreconciliab1e
differences of the parties come to the fore sooner or later.
Many of the parties that have been constituents of coalition governments
have come together only in the post-election scenario and had actually fielded
candidates against each other in the elections. In this context, it is necessary to
note that, in the States, governments formed by parties which had a pre-election
alliance had a longer average life-span as compared to single-party (majority)
governments.
15

12 The Prime Minister, Morarji Desai had an unenvious task in managing the coalition pieced
together to form the government. The ministers of the government spoke in different voices
and the Prime Minister had to frequently write to them requesting them to desist from making
remarks on issues even before they were discussed in the Cabinet.: Shastri, Sandeep, "Making
Coalition Governments More Effective", Mainstream, February IS, 1997. p. 8.
13 This government saw frequent clashes among the coalition partners and the disagreements
between the Prime Minister and his Deputy (Devi Lal) were often voiced in the open.
14 The United Front government was formed as a conglomeration of disparate political outfits
whose only common agenda was to prevent the BJP from coming to power. In the past, antiCongressism was the glue that held together several coalitions.
15 Parties entering into an alliance before an election invariably commit themselves to u common
programme and this factor is largely responsible for the relative stability of the government.
The relative stability of coalition governments in West Bengal and Kerala are indicative of this
trend.
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Coalitions have been described as a weak system of governance. The biggest problem as experienced during India's recent experiments with coalitions has
been that while political compulsions may have brought parties together to form
such governments, what is sadly lacking is responsible political management.
16

However, this is not to say that a coalition government emerging from a hung
Parliament is necessarily undesirable. I?
Devising strategies for increasing the effectiveness of this alternative model
of governance involving the management of inherent contradictions has become
imperative. What is therefore required is the revitalisation of existing institutions
to facilitate such a process and it is here that the role of the President is an indispensable one.
GOVERNMENT FORMATIONS FROM HUNG PARLIAMENTS - THE
PRESIDENT'S ROLE
The President under the Indian Constitution is empowered to appoint the
Prime Minister,18 but his choice is governed by the practice, grounded in political
and legal19 necessity, that he must appoint the person who can form a government
which will enjoy the confidence of Parliament.
Normally, this practice clearly indicates that the party leader who, having
majority support in the Lower House, has an indisputable claim to be appointed as
the Prime Minister. However, the phenomena of hung Parliaments since 1989,
especially the context of the eleventh and twelfth Lok Sabha elections, has queered
the Constitutional pitch, and increasingly, has focussed the political spotlight on
the President and the options before him.
16

Malik, Dipak, "Politics of Coalition", Mainstream, April 12, 1997, p. 4.

17 The view that coalition governments are undesirable is often based on the argument that singleparty governments are good because they are 'strong and effective', whereas coalitions are bad
because they are weak and indecisive. These assumptions need to be examined critically. A
single party government need not necessarily be either strong or effective. It needs to be understood that the difference between good, strong and decisive government and stubborn, intransigent government is incapable of clear and precise definition and is highly subjective. And if
strong government means determined government that does not give in to pressure or respond
to criticism, it is not necessarily a desirable quality: it can come close to authoritarianism and a
lack of accountability. Single-party governments can be advantageous only if they are also
responsive and accountable. No one would suggest that a strong, effective tyrant would be a
good thing. Where a government has a safe majority, there is very little to make it responsive to
pressure from Parliament.
18 Vide Art. 75 of the Constitution.
19 By virtue of Art. 75(3) which provides that "The Council of Ministers shall be collectively
responsible to the House of the People."
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In England, if no single party controls a majority in the House of Commons,
the Crown must use its own judgement in deciding as to who should be invited to
form the government. The Crown would then summon a leader who, in its estimate, is capable of controlling a majority by entering into a coalition or compromise with some other political party,
The election of a hung Parliament presents a broad range of possible procedures which may be relied upon, and the resulting governmental structures, In
England especially, there have have been precedents this century which provide a
dazzling array of choice. There have been instances of a Prime Minister, having
failed to secure a majority at the general elections, resigning immediatellO, staying in office to negotiate a coalition21, or waiting to meet Parliament to have his
fate decided on the motion on the loyal address in reply to the Queen's speech.22
The Sovereign might take some part in the resolution of the crisis23,or none.24There
could be a protracted succession25, or a resolution as speedy as if the electorate had
returned a majority governmene6, The administration which emerged could vary
in its composition from a minority government with negotiated aid from others so
as to ensure some degree of stability27, to a minority government enjoying no
. 28 , to a majorIty
.,
,
h
30 partIes,
•
support from ot h er partIes
coa I'ItlOn
0 f two 29 or tree
or
even a majority coalition of all the main parties3! .
In India, Presidents have invited the leaders of the single largest party to
form the government as also of those who, though not enjoying such status,
20

As did Baldwin in 1929.

21

As did Heath in February 1974.

22

Baldwin adopted this course in 1923.

23

As did George V, indirectly through his Private Secretary, in 1923-24.

24

The Queen did not have to intervene following the election of the February 1974 hung Parliament since there was a politically negotiated solution to the crisis: Turpin, Colin, British Government and the Constitution, 145 (3rd ed., 1995).

25

The longest this century lasted from the general election of December 6, 1923 to the appointment of MacDonald as the head of the first and minority Labour government on January 22,
1924 - a period of six weeks: Brazier, Rodney, Constitutional Practice, 2nd Edn., Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1994, p. 25.

26

As in February-March

27

Like the pact between the Liberal Democrats and the Labour Party which sustained the minority Callaghan government in office from March 1977 to July 1978: Ibid.

1974, a period of only 4 days: Ibid.

28

Such as the minority Labour governments of MacDonald (January to November 1924) and
Wilson (March to October 1974): Ibid.

29

As with the pact between the Conservatives and the Liberal Unionists from 1900-05:lbid.

30

The 'National Government'

31

The wartime coalition of Lloyd George which lasted between 1916 to 1922.

of 1931 to 1940.
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nevertheless are, by virtue of "outside support" or otherwise, able to command a
majority in the Lower House. Thus, a President necessarily enjoys a great deal of
discretion in such contexts.

*

*

*

*

*

It was some such discretion which President Reddy exercised in 1979 after
the fall of the Janata ministry in inviting Charan Singh to form the ministry,
and in not inviting Jagjivan Ram to do that, after Charan Singh resigned and
advised the dissolution of the Lok Sabha.32
After the general elections of 1989, no single party secured an absolute majority in the Lok Sabha.The President invited Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, the leader of
the Congress - which had won the largest number of seats - to form the
government. On his declining the offer, Mr. Y.P.Singh (representing the next
largest party), who had the support of various parties and groups and thus
could command a majority in the Lok Sabha was invited to form a government, which it duly accepted.
Again, in November 1990, when Prime Minister Mr. V.P.Singh resigned consequent to his government losing a vote of confidence in the House, the President once again invited Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, who declined once more. Thereafter, Mr. Chandrashekhar, who had secured the support of different groups
was invited to form a government, which took office in November, 1990.
The tenth Lok Sabha once again threw up a hung Parliament. Again, the
President appointed the leader of the single largest party Mr. P.Y. Narasimha
Rao, as the Prime Minister, subject to the condition that he proved his majority on the floor of the House within four weeks.33
In 1996, the President appointed the leader of the single largest party in the
House, Mr. A.B. Vajpayee as the Prime Minister, with the directive that he
was to prove his majority in the House within a span of two weeks - a requirement he was unable to comply with. Then, the President, after a long

32

Shukla, V.N., Constitution of India, 344 (1997).

33

A challenge to this appointment was dismissed by the Rajasthan High Court on the ground that,
inter alia,"law requires that the President must exercise his powers on the advice of the Council of Ministers, but that advice will not be available to him in the choice of a Prime Minister, where his
predecessor has been removed by death or his own resignation. In such a situation, the President has the discretion to follow convention and there is no legal bar to the same .... The
President is always empowered to take the final decision in such matters in accordance with the
law and conventions keeping in view the changing circumstances of the national life." Dalpat
v. The President, AIR 1992 Raj. 70 (para 18).
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period of uncertainty, appointed the United Front nominee, Mr. H.D. Deve
Gowda as the Prime Minister, who was able to prove his majority in the
Lower House by virtue of the "outside support" extended by the Congress
Party.

*

*

*

Subsequently, such support was withdrawn, the Gowda ministry was forced
to resign and in its place, the President installed the Gujral ministry - once
again propped up by the "outside support" of the Congress Party.
Whimsically, the Congress again withdrew support, plunging the entire nation into an acute political crisis. After hectic parleying by almost all political
combinations failed to indicate the possibility of forming a government, which
in the measured prose of the Rashtrapathi Bhavan, was " ... lawful, viable
and enjoys a reasonable prospect of stability", the President ultimately
dissolved Parliament.
In 1998, the phenomena of hung Parliaments re-appeared with the BJP-led

political front emerging as the single-largest political combination. This time,
the President had no hesitation in appointing Mr. Vajpayee as the Prime Minister and his ministry, though not commanding a majority of its own in the
House, managed to scrape through a vote of confidence.
A clearly decipherable behavioural pattern of all Presidents faced with the
scenario of fractured mandates has been that of extending the initial invitation to form the government to the leaders of the party garnering the largest
number of seats in the Lower House. Around such a practice has developed a
heated debate, the main issues of which are discussed hereunder:
IS THE PRESIDENT OBLIGED TO INVITE THE SINGLE LARGEST
POLITICAL GROUPING?
In other words, has the practice discussed above developed into a binding
Constitutional convention? The underlying logic behind such a practice is that in
a hung Lok Sabha, the single largest party or group has a better chance of commanding a majority. Mr. Fali Nariman, a Constitutional expert and a lawyer of
repute, opines that-

" ...there are no absolutes in this... The overriding factor is who, in the mature judgement and opinion of the President, will be able to command a
..
,,34
majorzty.
The implications of this opinion is that such a practice, though often adhered
to, has not blossomed into a binding, constitutional convention which would brook
34

Mitra, Sumit, "All the President's Choices", India Today, March 1998, p. 19.
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no departure whatsoever. Strength for such a view has also been expressed by the
Supreme Court lawyer and former Additional Solicitor-General, Mr.A.M. Singhvi,
who dismisses such a practice as a British practice transplanted to India.3s
Whatever the merits in such arguments, sticking to the practice of inviting the
leader of the single-largest political formation in a hung Parliament to form the
government would be the least controversial option open to the President - and it
would take a very brave President to choose not to exercise this option.
CAN THE PRESIDENT INVITE A POST ·POLL ALLIANCE?
Speaking about conciliations with America, Edmund Burke said- "...all governments are founded on compromise and barter." These words have a ring of
prescience in the present context which has seen pre-poll political adversaries
uniting after the elections to forge a combination to form a government.
"A post-poll alliance or coalition is just as good as pre-poll one,,36,
according to Lentin J. of the Antulay case fame. A President may invite such a
combination to form a government, provided its constituents agree on two crucial
issues -the composition of the government and its leadership. A contrary opinion is
expressed by Iqbal Chagla, a Bombay lawyer, according to whom "...a post-poll
alliance or coalition does not have the same credibility as a pre-poll one. ,,37
However, it is necessary to bear in mind that "sanctity" is not a commodity which
can be measured on a relative scale. It would be preposterous to argue that a prepoll alliance 'A', with a strength of 180 in a 540-strong House will make a more
sanctified alternative to a party 'B' which has forged a post-poll alliance with the
combine 'c' such a combination commanding the support of 320 members of
Parliament. Arun Jaitley opines that the post-poll promises of support and "all
that jazz of joint declarations are not of much worth ",what is required is the President's conviction.38 According to him, the President must call the largest group
first, unless there are good reasons for not doing SO.39
Thus, even on this aspect, a broad political and legal consensus remains distinctlyelusive.
35
36

Ibid., p. 21.
Ibid.

37

Ibid.

38

Ibid.

39

In this regard, the recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission Report assume importance.
The Report, while laying down guidelines for Governors in the choice of the party for forming
the government stated that in the event of no party gaining an absolute majority, a combination
of parties which is capable of commanding a majority in the House should be given the next
opportunity.
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In many Scandinavian countries, minority governments survive their full terms
because the opposition would not pull the rug from under the ruling party's feet.
However, the Indian experience has been that toppling governments has been reduced to a political bloods port. "Outside support" represents a case of two unwilling horses being yoked to the carriages of a bad marriage. The yoke is nothing but
the threat of yet another poll. The trouble with this prescription is that the dissolution of the eleventh Lok Sabha, primarily due to the Congress withdrawing its
'outside support' to the UF government, has already alerted the President to its
bitter taste-it has undoubtedly cast serious doubts in the President's mind about
the 'stability' and 'viability' of governments supported from outside.
The phenomenon of 'outside support,40 is yet another controversial area on
which the Constitution is silent. Art. 75(3) only states that the Council of Ministers
should be "collectively responsible" to the Lok Sabha.The precise modalities as to
how this condition is to be met - whether from coalition partners or those from
outside extending "issue-based" support - is of no Constitutional concern!
CAN THE PRESIDENT ENSURE A VIABLE, STABLE
GOVERNMENT?
What holds the key in government formation from hung Parliaments is that
the President enjoys an almost unfettered Constitutional freedom in the process.41
However, what are the possible tools at his disposal which would help him in this
regard? Can he rely upon the recent Supreme Court judgement in the 'Kalyan
Singh' case, and direct the newly-elected Members of Parliament to elect their
Prime Minister by secret ballot? Soli Sorabjee expressly disagrees "A floor test in
Lucknow is a way of ascertaining who is in majority. The issues before the 12th
Lok Sabha are entirely different. ,,42It is also not desirable for the President to
direct Prime Ministerial aspirants to parade supporting MPs - a frequent occurrence in most States.

40

The practice of parties extending support from the outside has, in the recent past, been unequivocally condemned as the villain of the peace responsible for bringing down as many as
five out of a total of six governments since 1989. The only exception was the Narasimha Rao
government which barely managed to last its full term, of which the first half saw it struggling
as a minority government. It is another matter that many of its leading lights faced trial for
bribing M.P.'s to survive a vote of confidence.

41

According to the Constitutional expert, Soli Sorabjee, the President in his choice of Prime
Minister can be guided by a prima facie opinion about the reasonable prospect of stability.

42 Ibid, p: 24.
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Then, what is the appropriate course of action for a President caught in this
thankless situation? Is it possible to solve the riddle by analysing the President's
own finding on the reason as to why the Gujral government fell- "00. no political
combination in the Lok Sabha was in a position to offer or receive the lawfully
valid support of the critical minimum number of MP' s required to secure a majority in the House." Thus, if a political party is unable to secure a majority on its
own, or with the help of its allies, its chances of receiving the "lawfully valid
support" of the "critical minimum number" will depend on a "considered" change
of heart by its electoral adversaries. And the President cannot allow horse-trading
or other such unethical courses which will seriously undermine the legitimacy of a
government.
And behind all these possible permutations and combinations in government
formation looms large yet another uncertainty, if an appointed government is to be
defeated on an early vote of confidence, would the President be obliged to permit
a further turn of the Constitutional roulette wheel, by granting a dissolution of
Parliament.
From the plethora of possibilities discussed above, it would seem that there
are no 'rules' about government formation from hung Parliaments. Such a vast
terrain of uncertainty does constitute a major grey area of the Constitution as recent controversies have illustrated, in graphic detail. The only possible 'rule' in
such circumstances is an open-ended and largely unhelpful one - namely, that in
choosing a Prime Minister the President should commission that person who appears best able to form a Government with a reasonable prospect of maintaining a
stable administration in office. However, such a formulation does not take us very
far. How, for exaample' can the President identify that person who might command a majority in a House comprised of a multitude of minority parties? It is also
necessary to take heed of the note of caution articulated by the English constitutional expert, Sir Rodney Brazier: He has rightly cautioned that precedents in government formations from hung Parliaments must necessarily be approached with
caution, as they are largely the result of political accommodations arrived at as a
result of both the political realities of the day and of the relationship between party
leaders. Such relationships have varied and will vary greatly from time to time,
making inter-party co-operation more, or less, likely. And accordingly, such precedents should not be considered as being rule-constitutive.43
Thus, in the absence of rules governing the formation of an administration
from a hung Parliament, this paper attempts to suggest a number of procedural
alternatives within the framework of the need to achieve 3 broad goals namely:
43

Brazier, Rodney, Constitutional Reform, 114 (1991).
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The need to preserve the perceived neutrality of the President;
To facilitate, to the extent possible, a political solution- that is, politicians themselves taking the initiative in solving this knotty problem; and
Lastly, to facilitate the effective continuance of government during the period of crisis.

FACILITATING

A SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS

Is the President bound by the advice of the outgoing Prime Minister in the
matter of selecting his successor? Lowell, writing in 1912, described any right of
a Prime Minister, who has lost the confidence of Parliament to nominate his successor as "improper, absurd and grotesque ,,44. It is submitted that the opinion of
an outgoing Prime Minister cannot be classified as ministerial advice but as the
view of a former (albeit the most recent) Prime Minister. As Harold Wilson has
written: "Contrary to widespread belief, there is no duty on the Prime Minister,
still less any inherent right, to recommend the man to be sent for. " 45
Thus, in this regard there is near-unanimity in all circles that in the choice of
the Prime Minister, the President enjoys a great deal of discretion.46

*

After the declaration of a fractured electoral result, the President, before any
active involvement, must facilitate a situation wherein the political crisis is
to be resolved, if possible, by negotiations between political parties. An example of a political solution to hung Parliaments has been the agreement
forged between the V.F. and the Congress in the period following elections
to the 11th Lok Sabha47•

This process, if successfully achieved can ensure that the President is not
involved in political controversies and thus helps to reinforce his impartiality.
However, if parties tend to stick to their anti-coalition position, this could
further muddy the political waters and in such a context, presidential intervention
in government formation might become imperative .Thus, the first stage in resolving the dilemmas posed to government formation by hung parliaments must necessarily be political decisions.
44

Basu, D.O. Commentary on the Constitution of lndia, 145 (7 ed., 1995).

45

cf. Supra no. 18, p. 35

46

This power is of a wider amplitude than that of the English Crown's "prerogative powers" of
appointing the Prime Minister.

47

In England, the problems of three hung Parliaments - in 1923, 1929 and 1974 were resolved by
negotiations between political parties: Alder, John, Constitutional and Administrative Law,
199 (2 ed., 1994).
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The formation of a coalition government from a hung Parliament, however
could be a lengthy, time-consuming process. It is submitted that a development of
the system of caretaker governments would ensure continuity of administration.
The operations of government have, to a large extent, been regularly suspended
for about a month from the announcement of a general election. These periods
have not caused the heavens to fall, and it is difficult to see why a longer period
during which coalition negotiations were held after the return of a hung Parliament would invite catastrophe.48
Such a caretaker government could either be the defeated administration being asked to stay on as such, till the vexatious issue of forming a government from
such an unhappy situation is resolved; alternatively, the President can appoint an
entirely new administration consisting of MPs (consisting of members from both
Houses), and eminent personalities from other walks of life-economists, lawyers,
scientists etc.
This would indeed be a non-novel solution, and indeed caretaker governments have worked well in India, although we have tended not to recognise them
as such.
In case the chances of government formation from a hung Parliament are
extremely remote, in view of irreconciliable postures of various parties, it would
also be possible for the President to form a National Government of all the parties,
and help run the government for a full term of five years. The President should try
to forge a consensus among the members of such a government in deciding as to
who should be appointed the Prime Minister, matters related to the allocation of
portfolios etc., failing which he should use his discretion in finding amicable solutions to such knotty problems.
Such an arrangement would be of great utility should, at any time, a coalition
government is made to fall due to the machinations of the supporting parties.This
mechanism would relieve the burden on the Exchequer in conducting a mid-term
election, spare the people of the ordeal of yet another election being forced on
them, and most importantly, ensure a stable and extremely democratic model of
government.
Thus, a majority of the members of the opposition parties may unite in defeating a government, but they must necessarily unite in electing an alternate Prime

48

It is even possible for such a government to introduce a minimalist budget, in consultation with
Parliament, supra n. 18, p. 40.
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Minister and Council of Ministers.Thus, indirectly, the opposition will have to behave with a sense of responsibility.
Such a procedure can also be incorporated into the Indian constitutional practice, not by legislative amendment, but by the President sending a message to the
Parliament, which he is empowered to do vide Art.86 of the Constitution, recommending it to adopt such a scheme in the conduct of its business.
Such an approach, if adopted would, to a large extent, ensure a greater degree
of stability in the functioning of coalition governments.
DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT - THE PRESIDENT'S DILEMMA
The election of a hung Parliament could set a constitutional time-bomb ticking in that a resulting minority government might be defeated on a vote of confidence, or a coalition government might disintegrate, so that another general election might be sought, perhaps within a very short time of the inconclusive poll.
With Art. 74(1) looming in the background, can the President refuse the Prime
Minister's request? Also, how can the President test the existence and viability of
an alternative administration in Parliament which might vitiate the need for another election. And how can the President be assured that if he were to refuse a
dissolution to one Prime Minister, he would not be forced to grant one to his
successor?
There is a general consensus on the point, both in India and in England, that
the President/Crown can refuse a request for a dissolution of Parliament49: the
difficulty lies in identifying the situations in which such action would be Constitutionallyappropriate.5o
49

The power to refuse a dissolution comprises yet another Royal Prerogative of the Crown in
England. In India, since there has been a general consensus on the point (as discussed earlier)
that the President, in the context of hung Parliaments, has almost unfettered discretion in appointing a Prime Minister, there would be no reason to hold as to why he should not have such
power in the dissolution of Parliament.

50

There have been no precedents in Indian Constitutional history from which any clear conclusions may be drawn. However, the matter recently arose in the Republic of Ireland. In November 1994, following a controversial appointment of a former Attorney-General to the position
of President of the High Court, the 22 month coalition government of Fianna Fail and the
Labour Party, collapsed. Article 13.2.2 of the Constitution ofIreland provides that: "The President may in his absolute discretion refuse to dissolve Dail Eirann on the advice of a Taoiseach
who has ceased to retain the support of a majority in the Dail Eirann." However, it is also clear
that the President cannot refuse dissolution to a Prime Minister who retains the support of a
majority in the Parliament (Dail). Three possible solutions could be sought in such a context:
1. The President could grant a dissolution on Prime Ministerial request and a General election
would take place; or
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Few today would assert that the President has no discretion in the matteralthough the prudence of granting a dissolution rather than refusing is stressed.
And in similar contexts, three Governor-Generals have provided dramatic evidence of actual refusal - in Canada51, in South Africa52 , and in Australia53•
THE PRESIDENT - NEED FOR A CONSTANT OMBUDSMANIC ROLE
"A Constitution is what a Constitution does, not what it professes. While
we cannot be carried away by the paper perfection of basic institutions
and the bamboo barricades of checks and balances. neither is it political sagacity to belittle the importance of structural legal engineering
and ombudsmanic monitoring as necessary for the health of a democratic polity. ,,54
The President's role, in the light of the 11th and 12th Lok Sabha elections, is
not to be confined to installing a relatively stable government in office, it also
extends to constantly and carefully scrutinising its activities, rectifying its mistakes
and in devising new and effecti ve methods of governance.
The President, at all times, and especially in an era of coalition governments,
must personally supervise the appointment of Governors to States, and carefully
2. The opposition parties could try and form a coalition and the President appoint its leader as
the Prime Minister; or
3. The Fianna Fail (the governing party) ministers could replace the Prime Minister with another leader who could secure a continued coalition government, in which case neither a dissolution nor a general election would be required.
Further, Article 28.1 0 of the Constitution provided that should the Prime Minister (the Taoiseach)
lose majority support by losing a formal vote of confidence, he would be obliged to resign.
When the Deputy Prime Minister, Dick Spring, announced that he would vote against the
Prime Minister. Albert Reynolds, in a vote of confidence, the Prime Minister resigned.
On the 15th of December, after five weeks of political turmoil,
Fine Gael Party. with the support of the Labour and Democratic
Minister. Thus, the second option has been preferred and a new
dissolution of Parliament. Barnett, Hilaire, Constitutional and
(1995).

John Bruton, the leader of the
Left Party, was elected Prime
government formed without a
Administrative Law, 169-170

51

In 1926, the Governor-General, Viscount Byng, refused Mackenzie King's (the minority Liberal Prime Minister) request, believing that Meighen. the Conservative Leader. could form a
government with a majority. Meighen's new government was defeated 4 days later on a vote of
confidence, and he was granted what Mackenzie King had been denied: Supra n. 18, p. 42.

52

In 1939 the Governor-General,
election, Supra n. 18, p. 42.

53

In 1975, the Governor-General, Sir John Kerr, refused Whitlam's request for a Senate, rather
than a general eJection: Supra no. 18, p. 42.

54

Iyer, V.R. Krishna, A Constitutional Miscellany. 1 (1986).

Sir Patrick Duncan, rejected Hertzong's request for a general
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monitor their functioning. In the recent past, we have witnessed constituents of
coalition governments trying to introduce some sort of a "spoils system"in the
administration as they lay claim to representation in the appointment of Governors. None of the inhabitants of Rashtrapathi Bhavan have shown an inclination to
put an end to this pernicious practice. The President must ensure that the pushes
and pulls of coalition politics do not vault political schemers and a creed of sycophants into the Raj Bhavans across India. The appointment of suitable55 candidates can pre-empt situations wherein the gubernatorial posts could be used for
partisan political designs. This is all the more significant since the dilemmas of
hung legislatures are also being replicated in the States, which are moving towards
a distinct phase of political fragmentation and ferment.
The President may also reactivate the interstate council as provided for under
Art. 26356 which may prove to be of immense utility in forging a national consensus, realising the true spirit of federalism and facilitating an efficient system of
governance.
In the absence of a clear constitutional mandate with respect to a hung parliament, we will have to depend upon and develop on what has been called the "unwritten parts of the Constitution" or the conventions which will have to necessarily be in harmony with the spirit and the general scheme of our Constitution. Thus,
it is necessary to develop by a systematic process, rules and practices to develop
alongside the laws of the Constitution. As Sir Ivor Jennings put it:
"The laws provide only a framework; those who put the laws into operation give the framework a meaning and fill in the interstices. Those who
take decisions create precedents which others tend to follow, and when

55

In this context, it is necessary to take note of the Sarkaria Commission's recommendations
which proposed that ", .. the Governor should be one who has not taken too great a part in
politics generally and particularly in the recent past." There was consensus among all the political parties on this aspect.

56

"263. Provisions with respect to an inter-State Council - if at any time it appears to the President that the public interest would be served by the establishment of a Council charged with the
duty of(a) inquiring into and advising upon disputes which may have arisen between States;
(b) investigating and discussing subjects in which some or all of the States, have a common
interest; or
(c) making recommendations upon any subject and, in particular, recommendations
better co-ordination of policy and action with respect to that subject.

for the

it shall be lawful for the President by order to establish such Council, and to define the nature
of the duties to be performed by it and its organisation and procedure,"
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they have been followed long enough, they acquire the sanctity and the
respectability of age. They not only are followed, but they have to be
followed. "
And it is upto the President, in the immediate context, to interstitially fill in the
constitutional grey areas and create binding precedents for the resolution of hung
Parliaments in the future.
THE ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT - NEED FOR A REDEFINITION
The constitutional crises thrown up by the 11th and 12th Lok Sabha elections
have regenerated the debate as to the exact nature and scope of the role of the
President within the frame work of the Indian Constitution. Although this should
have been a well settled constitutional area given the fact that we are nearing 50
years of the functioning of our Constitution, such is not the case, and intellectual
confusion abounds on this aspect. The crux of the question is whether the President, under the Indian Constitution, has any real powers or whether he is only a
decorative or titular head. Generally speaking, there are two dominant schools of
thought on the above subject.
On the one hand, many constitutional experts and academics argue that the
Indian President has to function as a constitutional head. It is their contention that
the position of the Indian President corresponds to that of the British monarch and
that he is only a titular or constitutional head of the State with no real powers, they
being actually in the hands of the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers. The
conventions or constitutional practices followed in England, whose parliamentary
democracy we claim to have borrowed, forms the basis of this view.
A well known commentator on the Indian Constitution, D.D. Basu, observes:
"The position today is that the debate whether the President of India has any
real power to act contrary to the advice given by the Council of Ministers has
become meaningless. By amending the Constitution in 1976 and in 1978, a
seal has been put to the controversy which had been mooted by President
Rajendra Prasad at the Indian Law Institute that there was no provision in the
Indian Constitution to make it obligatory upon the President to act only in
accordance with the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers."s7
57

Basu, D.O., Introduction to the Constitution of India 185 (13 ed., 1991). However, it is submitted that the Writer is not entirely correct. The very fact that the Constitution, in many provisions, has used the term 'powers' and not 'functions' clearly indicate a necessary distinction
which has to be made between the two terms. It logically follows that the President is bound
only insofar as the aid and advice pertains to the exercise of his functions. Also, since the
phrase 'aid and advice' is used in the Constitution, it cannot mean anything other than advice
which is constitutionally valid, and hence, the President who has taken an oath to protect,
preserve and defend the Constitution under Art. 60 can disregard any aid and advice which is
unconstitutional in character.
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By relying heavily on the Constituent Assembly Debates, some scholars
believe that the Indian President has the same powers as those Bagehot ascribes
to British crown - "the right to be consulted, the right to encourage and the
right to warn." Even the Supreme Court, in many cases, such as Ram Jawaya
Kapoor v. State of Rajasthan58, V.N.R. Rao v. Indira Gandhi59 and Samsher
Singh v. State of Punjab60 has concurred with such a construction. In fact, in the
latter case, it ruled: "Our Constitution embodies generally the Parliamentary or
Cabinet system of government of the British modeL.Under this system, the President is the constitutional or formal head of the Union and he exercises his powers
and functions conferred on him by or under the Constitution on the aid and advice
of his Council of Ministers.,,61
Whereas, the second school of consitutional opinion has argued that the Indian President is not a mere 'figurehead', 'a decorated dummy', 'a rubber stamp'
or any such term that seems to be freely bandied about nowadays.
According to Munshi, the obligations and the responsibilities to which the
President is obliged are different from and superior to those of the Vice President,
the Prime Minister or any other Minister or the Union. He has further pointed out
that the President enjoys supra ministerial powers62 like the dismissal of a Prime.
Minister who does not enjoy the confidence of the House.
B.N. Rao has pointed out that, even if in any particular instance, the President acts otherwise than the ministerial advice, the validity of that act cannot be
questioned in any Court on any ground63.

58

AIR 1995 SC 549.

59

AIR 1971 SC 1002.

60

AIR 1974 SC 2192. Ray, c.J., delivering the leading judgment, interpreted the Constitutional
scheme in the following manner:
"Our Constitution embodies generally the Parliamentary or Cabinet system of Government of
the British model both for the Union and the States. Under this system, the President is the
Constitutional or formal head of the Union and he exercises his powers and functions conferred
on him by or under the Constitution on the aid and Advice of his Council of Ministers ...
Wherever the Constitution requires the satisfaction of the President or the Governor for the
exercise ... of any power or function, the satisfaction required by the Constitution is not the
personal satisfaction of the President or Governor but the satisfaction ... in the Constitutional
sense in the Cabinet system of Government..."

61

Munshi, K.M, The President Under the Indian Constitution, 35-36 (1963).

62

Supra ministerial powers might be taken to mean powers of the President, in the exercise of
which he is not bound by ministerial advice.

63

Rao, B.N., India's Constitution in the Making, 375 (1960): A view approved in Mukharji, P.B.,
The Critical Problems of the Indian Constitution, 21 (1968).
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In the opinion of a former Chief Justice of India, "the electoral element in his

selection, the protective oath prescribed and administered and the elaborate and
difficult procedure adopted for his removal negative the common conception that
the President is an 'impotent spectator' .,,64
H.M.Seervai, in his commentary on the Indian Constitution, observed that, if
the debates in the Constituent Assembly were permissible aids to interpreting the
provisions of our Constitution, then it could be plausibly argued that by dropping
the Instrument of Instructions, the Constituent Assembly indicated its intention
that the President was not bound by the advice of the Council of Ministers. 65
Another possible interpretation of the position of the Indian President has
been that put forward by none else than the former Indian President, R.
Venkataraman, who called himself a 'copy book' President.66
On a plain reading of the Constitution, there can be no doubt that the President is the real head of the Executive67, and Art. 53 is emphatic in that regard.
There is no mention of the Council of Ministers, or the Cabinet in connection with
the exercise of powers by the President, except in Arts. 74, 75, 77(3), 78 and
352(3). Even in these articles, with the exception of Art. 352(3) all that is stated
is that, in the exercise of his functions the President shall be aided and advised by
a Council of Ministers, headed by the Prime Minister, whose tenure of office itself
is, however, made expressly dependent on the pleasure of the President.68
It is also important to realise that the Constitution itself has, by necessary
implications, enabled the President to disregard any unconstitutional advice tendered by the Council of Ministers, since, the phrase 'aid and advice' is necessarily
to be confined only to those which are constitutional in character.
64

Subbarao, v., Some Constitutional Problems, 279 (1970).

65

Seervai, H.M., Constitutional Law of India Vol. 2, 106 (1976).

66

Venkataraman, R., My Presidential Years, 482 (1994). He further observes: " ... Defining the
powers of the President in a Parliamentary Democracy, I compared it to an emergency lamp,
which came into operation when power failed and became dormant when power was restored.
I said that the responsibility for the administration of the country rested with the Prime Minister
who carried the confidence of Parliament and the President was not an appellate or supervisory
authority over the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. He could also, like the Crown in England
advise, guide and warn the Cabinet, but should abide by the decision of the Council of Ministers."

67

In this regard, it is interesting to note the statement of Pathak, J., in Kehar Singh v. Union of
India, AIR 1989 SC 653 at 657 where he said that "the power to pardon rests on the advice
tendered by the Executive to the President" (emphasis added). A judicial misinterpretation of
this magnitude is indicative of a fundamental failure to appreciate the clear mandate of Art. 53( I)
and is an unpardonable judicial distortion of the import of the Article.

68

See, Kuriakose, K.V., "The President ofIndia: Status and Position",

14 (1987) IBR 238.
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It has been contended by some that there is nothing in the Constitution to
prevent a strongly assertive or dictatorial President from brushing aside or dispensing with the 'aid and advice' of the Council of Ministers and administering
the country on his own. In such a case, it may be possible to contend that he did
not violate any express provisions of the Constitution, going by a liberal interpretation thereof, unless Art. 74(1) is held to be mandatory.69 Prof. Alan Gledhill has
conjured up the lurid image of such an Indian President as described above, by a
purely legalistic and literal interpretation of our Constitution and observes: "This
may seem a nightmare,
but it is not dissimilar to the way the Weimar Constitution
70
was destroyed" .
It is also submitted that the 'aid and advice' is confined to the exercise of the
President's executive functions and cannot be extended to include 'rights' or 'powers' . Therefore, wherever, the President is conferred with a 'power', it is clear
that the Council of Ministers cannot interfere with the exercise of such powers
under the guise of 'aid and advice,.71
As far as the President is concerned, there are several areas of his own
discretion set apart in several Articles - Arts.n, 123,347,309,352,356,75
- to
name only a few, wherein he is not bound by any aid and advice of the Council of
Ministers.
Also, the word 'aid' essentially means assisting. As the word 'advice' follows the word 'aid', the rule of ejusdem generis - construction may be resorted
to. The word 'and' is conjunctive of the two words and consequently, the word
'advice' has to be taken as a genera of 'aid' and has necessarily to fulfil a purpose
as done by 'aid'. It would naturally follow that the phrase, 'aid and advice' is of an
assisting variety and not of a compulsory character.

69

Ibid., p. 211.

70

Gledhill, Alan, The Republic of India, 116 and 121 (1964).
However, it is submitted that the basic premise of such an argument - "without violating any
provisions of the Constitution is fundamentally flawed. This is because such actions of the
President would be against all norms of democratic governance and therefore, unconstitutional,
being violative of the Preamble of the Constitution itself which has resolved to constitute India
into a "Democratic Republic". Thus, such a warped argument is a product of over imaginative
construction and is a practical as well as a constitutional impossibility.

71

•A power' is the ability of a person to produce a change in a legal relationship by doing or not
doing a given legal act. 72 c.J.S. 138.
Thus, in case of a power, the President has an option to do or not to do a particular act. For
instance, in case of Art. 72, the option of either exercising the power to pardon or not. But in the
case of a function, the President is obliged to do a particular act - discretion is lacking in such
a case.
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Therefore, in the light ofthe above discussions, involving a clear and precise
reading of the relevant constitutional provisions, it would be proper to conclude
that:

*

*

*

The President has to act on his own in certain spheres, for instance in the
appointment of a Prime Minister and the dissolution of Parliament. In such
cases, he has to exercise his independent judgement without being bound by
any advice of the Council of Ministers.
His own opinion and decisions, according to the exercise of the discretion
vested in him, is paramount in matters arising under Arts. 72, 75, 123, 124,
127,128,108,263,304,309,347,349,
324,356,360,365 etc.
It is also imperative to realise that when the Constitution refers to the 'satisfaction of the President' it cannot be anything but his personal satisfaction,
and not that of the Council of Ministers as has been construed in a few
judicial pronouncements.

Thus, on a reasonable construction of the relevant constitutional provisions, it
would be necessary to conclude that the President ofIndia is not a 'rubber stamp',
given the nature, varieties, complexities and the responsibilities of his august office. This is not to suggest that we have a Presidential form of government72, but
only to say that the Constitution has mandated a more active role for the President,
in co-ordinating and co-operating with and at the same time, acting as a check on
the possibility of the misuse of powers, by the Parliament.
CONCLUSION
Vox Populi does not wish him to be a mere ceremonial head and neither does
the Constitution through its unambiguous provisions. In spite of this, the preponderant point of view manifested in the Indian Constitutional practice thus far has
made him a mere figure head, a symbol which has to register the decisions of the
Council of Ministers and give them out as the august and sagacious decisions of
the President, euphemistically.

72

What M. Pompidou, DeGaulle's Premier and later President of France, has said about the
Constitution of the Fifth Republic can very well be a description of the form of government
envisaged by the Indian Constitution, derived by necessary implication on a plain reading of
the relevant Constitutional provisions;
"Our Constitution is a halfway between a properly Presidential regime and a properly Parliamentary one. The balance between the two ... has the advantage of making our political system
capable of firmness, stability, and at the same time, of flexibility." : Minathur, Joseph, "India's
Choice: President or Prime Minister", (1980) CULR, p. 190.
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An analysis of the powers of the President in only two spheres - namely, in
appointing a Prime Minister, and in the dissolution of Parliament - would lead to an
unmistakeable conclusion that the President enjoys a vast reservoir of discretionary powers, to be exercised by him with a high degree of independence.
The amendment to Art. 74(1) has led to every other provision of the Constitution being seen through the key hole of that Article-A distortion of the entire
constitutional scheme, which, even in the strictest and narrowest sense of the word
is nothing but an infringement of the most basic structure of the Constitution that of the form of government envisaged by it.
As Easton has commented, Constitutions essentially function as a "system maintenance" mechanism - it helps a political system to respond to the various
demands and supports that are directed to it in the form of inputs. Then, the
Constitution and the corresponding constitutional frame work of powers help to
process demands and supports and help in converting them into outputs, which
subsequently are re-introduced as inputs.73 Corresponding to such a framework is
the institution of the President. The present situation demands of him an assertive
and responsible role which, if displayed can then become an effective input for the
development of an advanced culture.
The need of the hour is not to switch over from one system of government to
another. The Parliamentary system is not an easy one to work; on the contrary, it
is a daunting one. And they are even more so in the case of a Presidential system.
No one has stated this in a better way than Balfour:
"Constitutions are easily copied, temperaments are not; and if it should
happen that the borrowed Constitution and the native temperament fail
to correspond, the misfit may have serious results. ,,74
"It is not enough to appeal to the spirit of the past", said Harold Laski, "it
is urgent to create the environment in which that spirit can have a new birth. "
The revitalisation of constitutional safeguards and the cardinal role of the President in this regard is a crucially important agenda for the sustenance of a healthy
and viable democratic set-up in India in its fiftieth year of independence and beyond. Such a revitalisation could provide the appropriate political setting for the
successful working of coalition governments and the effective discharge of its
responsibilities. The constitutional crises created by the fractured mandates of the
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Mahler, Gregory, Comparative Politics: An Institutional and Cross-National Approach, 42
(1992).

74

Supra n. 5, p. 102.
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11th and 12th Lok Sabha elections and the resultant hung Parliaments have already created a conducive environment, for the rebirth of the Indian Presidency a new avatar which will necessitate a more assertive and responsible role by the
Rashtrapathi. Never has the need for such a rebirth been greater!

